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ON THE
BIDDING POTEKTIAL FOR AGRICULTURAL LAND
The size structure of farms, the control of farming, and the future
of the family farm are issues that are all related to the ownership and
control of a unique rural resource--land. The future complexion of the
U. S. countryside is intimately tied to the ability of different
economic groups to gain and maintain control of the land base. Con
tinuation of past trends in farm enlargement and off-farm migration
would vest the control of the farming community in fewer and larger
operating units.
Krause and Kyle (pp. 752-755) have outlined many of the incentives
for further potential Increases in the incidence of large farming
units: (1) production and marketing economies, (2) management
expertise, (3) tax incentives, (4) nonfarm investment, (3) specializa
tion, and (6) conglomeration. Armstrong acknowledges these incentives,
but also cites potential limits or impediments that may temper the
continued trend toward larger units: (1) managerial talent availabil
ity, (2) problems of coordination and supervision, (3) capital avail
ability, (4) labor availability, and (5) risk and uncertainty.
While previous studies have identified some important aspects of the
farm size and control Issues, the extant literature provides no overall
theoretical framework within which to incorporate these key incentives
and diseconomies. The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical
•?
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approach that can be used to determine the relationship between land
ownership and the various characteristics of existing farm size classes,
It is assumed that the future ownership of land will be determined by
the relative bidding potential of participants in the land market.
A theoretical model of maximum bid-price is developed in Section I
and discussed in Section li. In Section III, an application of the
model is made to cash-grain farms in Iowa. Finally, in Section IV,
a summary and some conclusions of the study are offered.
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I, Theoretical Model
The basis for the developinent of a theoretical model of bidding
potential is provided by Pratt. In his fonnulation of a measure of
the degree of risk aversion, he defines the bid price as the largest
amount a decision maker would willingly pay to obtain a risk (p. 124).
This bid price is given by the equation
(1) u(x) = E lu(x + z - B)
where x represents the level of assets held by the decision maker;
u, his utility function; E, the expected value operator; z, the
risk; and B, the bid price.^ In this analysis, x will be interpreted as
the level of net worth of the decision maker and z as a random variable
denoting the value of an acre of land. The term B then represents the
maximum price a decision maker would be willing to pay for that acre.
By using a Taylor expansion to expand u around x (Yamane, pp. 280-281),
an approximation for the bid price can be derived from the quadratic equation
(2) 1/2 u"(x)B^ - [E(z)u"(x) + u'(x)]B
+ 1/2 [a^ + [E(z)]^l u"(x) + E(z)u'(x) = 0
z '
where u'(x) and u"(x) are the first and second derivatives of the utility
2
function, and E(z) and cj are, respectivel)^ the expected value and
z
variance of the value of an acre of land.
By utilizing Pratt's measure of risk aversion (p. 125)
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equation (3) can be rewritten as
(4) 1/2 r(x)B^ - [r(x)E(z) - IjB + 1/2 r(x){a^ + [K(z)]^!- E(z) =0
z
Solution of this quadratic equation gives B in terms of r(x), £(2), and
2
a .
z
If, however, z is defined as the discounted value of future income
from an acre of land and is derived from a standard perpetuity model
2
incorporating a constant rate of growth, the value of an acre of
land can be defined as
(5) 2 =
^ (i - g)
where y represents a random before-tax income stream, t is the marginal
income tax rate of the decision maker, g is the expected rate of growth
of after-tax income, and i is the decision maker's discoimt rate for
2
pure time preference. Then E(z) and <7 #respectively become
z
(6) E(z) = E(y)
(7) = g -1)
L(i - g) J y
Substituting (6) and (7) into (4), gives
(8) 1/2 r(x)B^ - r(x)(l - t)E(v) .
(i - g)
• B
-
2p
. -(i - g)-
+ l/2r(x)
2 2'
<yt + Uy)
Now, the maximum bid price B is defined in terms of the parameters of
the utility function (through the measure of the degree of risk
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aversion, r(x) ); the expected value and variance of income, E(y) and
2
the expected rate of growth of income, g; the marginal tax rate of
the decision maker, t; and the decision maker's rate of pure time
preference, i. Specification of the values of these parameters and
variables allows the calculation of the bid price for any potential
purchaser of farmland.
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II, Decision Maker Characteristics and the Maximum Bid Price
The values of the parameters and variables in the bid-price
equation (8) are related to the characteristics, capabilities, and
expectations of the decision maker. An evaluation of the influence of
these parameters and variables on the maximum bid price for an acre
of land can be carried out by taking the total differential of (8)
2
and solving for the effects on B of changes in E(y), x, r(x), t,
i, and g. Thus,
.9) dB ^ (1 - t) > Q
dE(y) (i - g)
(10)
dB_ ^ _ r(x)(l - t) < Q
da" 2D(1 - g)
where D = r(x) + 1.
(11) M = - r'(x)N Q
dx D
where N »=
(12)
JT72 B-|T72 ; g] E(y) J +i [ I ] Cy. The sign
of dB/dx depends upon whether the decision maker exhibits an increasing,
unchanged, or d.ecreasing degree of risk aversion over wealth, as deter
mined by the sign of r'(x).
dB
dr(x)
JL
D
< 0
(13)
dt
E(v)
L(i - g)
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r(x)(l - t)a^
D(i - g)^
< 0
The sign of dB/dt is ambiguous because a change in the marginal tax rate
influences the bid price in two ways. An increase in the marginal tax
rate will (1) decrease the bid price through a reduction in expected
after-tax income from an acre of land, but (2) increase the bid price
through a reduction in the variability of after-tax income.
(14)
(15)
M - C1 - t)
di " " .
(i - 8)
M = (1 - t)
dg
(1 - 8)
Elxl
r(x)(l - t)a
^ 0
(i - 8) D(i - 8)
^ 0
(i - g) D(i - g)'
The signs of dB/di and dB/dg likewise are ambiguous without knowl
edge of the sizes of the parameters in the model. The effect of
\
i and g on the bid price, however, will be of equal magnitude but
opposite sign.
Interpretation of equations (9) - (15) leads to the following
general results:
(a) A ceteris paribus increase in expected before-tax income
resulting from economics of scale in production or marketing,
more efficient management, specialization, or conglomeration
will result in a higher maximum bid price per acre.
(b) A ceteris paribus increase in the variability of before-
tax income resulting from greater degrees of operating or
-8-
financial leverage or from additional exogeneous uncertainty
will result in a lower maximum bid price.
(c) A ceteris paribus increase in the initial wealth position of
the decision maker will result in a higher maximtim bid price
if the decision maker is decreasingly risk averse over wealth
(r'(x) < 0). If the decision maker is increasingly risk
averse (r*(x) > 0), an- increase in the initial wealth position
will result in a lower maximum bid price. If the decision
maker's degree of risk aversion remains unchanged over
wealth (r'(x) = 0), the bid price will be unaffected by
an increase in the initial wealth position.
(d) A ceteris paribus increase in the degree of risk aversion
resulting from changes in the parameters of the utility
function will lead to a reduction in the maximum bid price.
(e) A ceteris paribus increase in the marginal tax rate will,
under reasonable assun^tions about the sizes of the para
meters in the model, lead to a reduction in the maximum
bid price.
(f) A ceteris paribus increase in the decision maker*s rate of
pure time preference will, under reasonable assumptions about
the sizes of the parameters in the model, lead to a reduction
in the maximum bid price,
(g) A ceteris paribus increase in the decision maker's expected
rate of growth of after-tax income will, under reasonable
assumptions about the sizes of the parameters in the model,
lead to an increase in the maximum bid price.
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These conditions also can be interpreted in the specific context of
potential future ovmership of farmland. If it can be assumed that
prospective buyers in the land market are decreasingly risk averse
over wealth, land will be acquired by those bidders with (1) the highest
expected before-tax inccme per acre, (2) the lowest variability of before-
tax income, (3) the largest initial wealth position, (4) the lowest
degree of risk aversion, (5) the lowest marginal income tax rate, (6)
Che lowest rate of pure time preference, and (7) the highest expected
rate of growth of after-tax income.
It is likely, however, that no bidder will have an absolute
advantage in all these categories. For example, decision makers
with the highest expected income per acre may also be in the
highest tax bracket. The ultimate winners in the land bidding
process can be identified only with numerical specification of the
parameters and variables in equation (8). Ihe next section presents
a numerical application of the model to cash-grain acreage in Iowa.
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III. Farm Size and Bidding Potential for Cash-Grain Acreage
To demonstrate the applicability of the theoretical model to the
issues of land ownership and control, maximum bid prices were estimated for
various size categories of cash-grain farms in lowa.^ The size categories used
were Class 0-IV farms from the 1969 Census of Agriculture. The Census
indicates, for each of the classes, the total acreage, number.of farms,
and average size of farm. In 1969, for example, the average size of
cash-grain farms in Iowa ranged from more than 1,300 acres for farms
in Class 0 to 170 acres for farms in Class IV (line 1, Table 1).
Data
Various sources of data were used in an attempt to define the
characteristics of the average cash-grain farmer in each size category.
Estimates were necessary for E(y), t, i, g, x, and r(x) for each
size classification.
Expected before-tax income The expected before-tax income per
acre for 1970, E(y), was based on the 1969 average as derived from
Census data. Expected before-tax net income attributable to ownership
of an acre of land was estimated by summing the market value of all
agricultural products sold and receipts from government farm programs,
subtracting total farm production expenses, and dividing the result
by the total number of acres in cash-grain farms (lines 4-9, Appendix),
Net income figures ranged from $39,16 per acre for Class I farms down
to $19,04 per acre for Class IV farms (line 2, Table 1), Note that
economies of size resulted in increasing returns to size over
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Classes IV to I, Moving from Che average Class I size farm to
the average Class 0 size, however, brought a reduction in net Income
per acre.
Income variability Variability of before-tax income per acre
for each size class was estimated by using 1965-1969 time-series data
obtained from Iowa Farm Business Association records. The coefficient
of variation was estimated for each size class in the Farm Business
record survey and applied to the average net income figure for the
appropriate size class in the Census scheme to give an estimate of
the standard deviation of income, cr^, (line 3, Table 1).
Marginal tax rates Taxable income per farm was estimated to
determine the appropriate marginal tax rate for each size category.
Total net income, as derived earlier, was divided by number of farms
to get net income per farm for each size category (line 10, Appendix).
According to a study by Evenson, for Iowa farms during 1969
and 1970, taxable farm profits as reported by the Internal Revenue
Service represented about 46 percent of net farm income as reported
by the USDA, Application of the 46 percent adjustment to net income per
farm gave per-farm taxable income from farming for each size category
(line 11, Appendix).
Off-farm income for each class size was obtained from the Survey
of Agricultural Finance-1970. This income includes reported receipts
from all off-farm activities or sources of income, excluding government
payments. Off-farm income per farm was added to taxable income from
farming to get total taxable income per farm (lines 12-13, Appendix).^
-13-
The marginal tax rate (t) for each class size was then obtained
I'nwn ilie l-'eclerul and Iowa lax LublcH. Thone rales ruuKotl Innii'i')
percent for Class 0 fanns to 24 percent for Class IV farms (line 4,
Table 1).
Discount and growth rates The nominal rate of pure time pref
erence, i, for transforming expected income, E(y), into value per acre,
z, was determined by estimating a risk-free rate and adding a component
for risk of reduced purchasing power caused by inflation. The risk-free
rate represents the compensation the decision maker requires simply for
postponing comsumption. The inflation premium guarantees that consump
tion, in real terms, can be maintained at the same level as that post
poned at the time an investment is made in an acre of land.
The risk-free rate was estimated by calculating a weighted average
of annual Treasury Bill rates (Federal Reserve Bulletin, various
issues). The inflation premium rate was estimated by using a weighted
average of annual rates of change in the Index of Prices Paid by
Farmers (Agricultural Statistics, p. 458). The index chosen was that
for "all commodities bought for use in production and family maintenance."
To eiftphasize the likely importance of recent experience in the
formulation of consumption plans and inflationary expectations,
geometrically declining weighted averages were calculated over the
1960-1969 period for both the Treasury Bill and price index rates.
The expected rate of growth in per-acre income (and thus per-acre
value), g, was estimated by using annual rates of change in average Iowa
farmland values over the 1960-1969 period (Murray and Porter, p. 8).^
Again, to capture the likely influence of recent years'
-14-
experxence on the generation of expected growth rates, a geometrically
declining weighted average was used.
Because of lack of information on differences among size classes
in rates of pure time preference and expected growth rates, it was
assumed that those rates were the same for all groups (lines 5-6,
Table 1).
Net worth The average net worth (equity) for each class of
cash-grain farms was estimated from data provided by the Survey of
Agricultural Finance-1970. Net worth is defined as the difference
between total owned assets and total liabilities. Total assets
include "owned land and buildings" and "other owned assets." Total
liabilities include "real-estate debt" and "non-real estate
debt." Of the four components of assets and liabilities, all but
other owned assets could be obtained directly from the Finance
Survey.
In estimating other owned assets, it was necessary to assume that
those assets comprised, at the state level, the same proportion of
owned land and buildings as at the national level where such information
was available (Hottel, Reinsel and Growley). For example, national
estimates for 1970 indicate that, for Class 0 farms, other owned assets
represented a value 77 percent as large as that for the value of land
and buildings owned. Similar calculations for the remaining classes
also were based on national relationships between other owned assets
and Che value of land and buildings owned. With the estimation of other
owned assets, equity in owned resources (net worth) was calculated for
all operators in each class size. Finally, it was assumed that the
-15-
assets of the average cash-grain farm were comparable to those of
Class II farms in general. That is, the relationship between other
assets owned and value of land and buildings for cash grain farms
was the same as for all enterprise type Class II farms.
Unfortunately, equity levels were not directly available for cash-
grain class sizes from the Finance Survey. Estimates, however, were
made on the basis of the assumption that the ratio of average cash-grain
equity to average equity for all farms could be extended across classes.
Thus, it was assumed that, If the average cash-grain farm had twice the
equity of the average equity of all farms, then the average Class II
cash-grain farm would have twice the equity of the average Class II
farm In general. Applying this allocation procedure to the equity
figures calculated for all operators gave equity levels ranging from
over $230,000 for Class 0 cash-grain farms to less than $50,000 for
Class IV cash-grain farms (line 7, Table 1).
Degree of Risk Aversion To calculate a measure of the degree
of risk aversion, r(x), it was necessary to estimate a utility function
for farmers. Although several studies have examined the nature of
farmers' utility (Officer and Halter, Halter and Beringer, Halter and
Dean, Johnson), few have reported specific estimation of the parameters
of utility functions. An exception is the study of Lin, Dean, and
g
Moore (LDM). They reported the utility functions derived for six
large-scale farmers in California, Because the form and parameters of
the six functions differed, and in as much as LDM found no obvious
direct relationship between the utility function and the size or form
of the ownership of the firm, a composite utility function was constructed,
-16-
With the three quadratic utility function cases of LDM, data
points were generated over the range from $0 to $100,000 in order to
9
create a composite scatter diagram between utility and monetary value.
A new composite utility function was then estimated through these data
points.
A simple Cobb-Douglas form was chosen for the estimation of utility
as a function of wealth (x) because it avoids the problem of ranges of
decreasing marginal utility. The resulting composite utility function was
(16) u = 35.6518x°"^°^^ = .93 t = 28.28
The value for the degree of risk aversion was obtained by solving
equation (3) using the specification of the utility function in
equation (16), Thus,
(17) r(x) = 0.6984x"^
Because of a lack of direct data for Iowa cash-grain farmers it was
assumed that the composite utility function developed from the LDM data
was applicable to the Iowa illustration. This requires two somewhat
heroic leaps of faith--that the LDM sample was representative of
California farmers and that Iowa farmers, in general, have a utility
function similar to that of their California counterparts. Because
this numerical example was designed to be illustrative rather than
definitive, however, it was thought to be worthwhile to pursue the risk
consideration on the basis of the LDM utility function.
The Cobb-Douglas utility function describes a decision maker with
diminishing marginal utility over the entire range of wealth and with
decreasing risk aversion over wealth. The measure of risk aversion,
r(x), thus decreased from .01467 to .00298 over the levels of wealth
from Class IV to Class 0 respectively (line 8, Table 1).
-17-
Bld price solutions and differences
Solutions of equation (8) using the farm class characteristics
given in Table 1 give a range of maximum bid prices from $533 per acre
10
for Class I farms to $231 per acre for Class IV farms (line 9, Table 1).
In order of bidding potential, the classes rank from highest
to lowest as I, II, 0, III, IV. The surprising result is that the
largest class size. Class 0, falls in the middle of the bidding-
potential range.
To try to isolate the relative importance of the class size
characteristics on the bid-price differentials between classes, bid
prices were calculated by using incremental changes in characteristics.
Results are shown in Table 2. For exanq)le, line 1 of Table 2 compares
Classes 0 and I. Column 1 gives the bid-price as $429.08 per acre for a
decision maker with all Class 0 characteristics. Column 2 shows that
the bid-price would decline $10,09 to $418.99 if the decision maker had
all Class 0 characteristics but had the net worth of a Class I decision
maker. Column 3 shows that the bid price would increase $76.19 to $495.18
($429.08 - $10.09 + $76.19) if a decsion maker with Class 0 characteristics
and Class I net worth also had a Class I marginal tax rate. Summing
across line 1 for the O-I classes gives the Class I bid price of $533.40.
Interpretation of the Information in Table 2 offers some general
insights. If all decision makers have the same utility function, rate
of pure time preference, and expected growth rate, and if the parameters
and values used in the model are indeed representative of the character
istics of the various size classes, then the major sources of bid-price
differentials are differences in before-tax income per acre and
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differences in marginal tax rates. Differences in net worth position
and income variability, however, also have some influence.
Finally, the importance of size and the degree of risk aversion
can be assessed by comparing the calculated bid prices with those that
would pertain to a risk-neutral decision maker. If the decision maker
is risk neutral, r(x) =0 and the maximum bid price in (8) would be
given by
(18) B= (1 I g) E(y).
Comparisons of calculated bid prices using the utility function given
in equation (16) with those using any risk-neutral utility function
are given in Table 3. The difference between the bid prices represents
the risk premium required by the decision maker. In general, the size
of the risk premium increased as the farm size declined. Note that
the bid prices for risk-neutral Class III and IV farmers are less
than those for risk-averse Class 0, I, and II farmers.
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IV. Summary and Conclusions
The trend of the last two decades to larger and larger farming
units has been viewed by n^ny as a threat to the family farm. Dis
agreement exists as to whether that trend will continue. The analysis
in this paper was based on the assumption that the future control of
farming will be vested in those farmers with the greatest bidding
potential for agricultural land. A theoretical model was developed
to explore some of the important variables affecting that bidding
potential, and a numerical example of the model was developed for
cash-grain farms in Iowa.
The theoretical model was constructed to determine the maximum
bid-price that would be made for an acre of land by a decision maker
with a given set of characteristics, capabilities, and expectations.
The variables included that have an ln5)act on the maximum bid price are
(1) before-tax net income per acre, (2) variability of income per acre,
(3) initial net wealth position, (4) degree of risk aversion,
(5) marginal income tax rate, (6) required rate of return on invest
ment, and (7) expected rate of growth in land income and prices.
As such, the model is capable of incorporating most arguments that are
typically advanced for or against the continued growth of farming units.
The numerical example identified and estimated the average charac
teristics of Iowa cash-grain farmers in each of the Census farm size
classes 0-IV for the year 1969. These characteristics were inserted
into the model to determine the maximum 1969 bid price by the average
farmer in each class. Estimated bid prices ranged from a high of
$533 per acre for Class I to a low of $231 per acre for Class IV.
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Although the results of the numerical example must be interpreted
with caution, they do provide some insight. First, it seems that the
largest farms may not have the greatest bidding advantage after all.
A combination of higher marginal tax rate and diseconomies of size
may cause Class 0 farmers to have a lower maximum bid price than either
Class I or Glass II farmers.
Or, interpreted differently, if Class 0 farmers are to consistently
outbid smaller farmers, they must have a lower degree of risk aversion,
a lower required rate of return on investment, or a higher expected
growth rate for income and land prices than smaller farmers. If all
farmers have the same utility function, the same required rate of
return, and the same expected growth rate (as we have assumed in the
model) it seems that the greatest threat to the small family farm
is the larger family farm.
The results of this study are consistent with the conclusions of
Krause and Kyle regarding the importance of economies of size and tax
incentives in the growth of farming units. In addition, however, the
results indicate that wealth position, income variability, and the
degree of risk aversion are important considerations for the issues
of the ownership and control of farmland. If public policy is intended
to "save the family farm," it may be necessary to devise schemes to
deal with all these factors.
Small farmers may be at a particular disadvantage in their attempt
to bid away land from their larger neighbors. For example, even if
Class III and IV farmers are risk neutral, the results of the study
imply that they have lower maximum bid prices than risk-averse Class 0,
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I, and II farmers. Thus, policies designed to shift the burden of
risk away from small farmers, in and of themselves, may be inadequate
to make those farmers competitive in the land market.
The analysis in this study points out the need for additional
work at both the theoretical and empirical level. Extensions of the
model could be made to treat the original level of wealth as'a random
variable so that the impact of diversification could be considered.
This would be especially fruitful for the extension of the model to
evaluate the bidding potential of nonfarm investors. In addition,
at the theoretical level, more complete specifications of before-tax
income could be utilized to directly evaluate the impact of economies
and diseconomies• of size.
The attempt to generate meaningful estimates of decision maker
characteristics, capabilities, and expectations painfully demonstrated
the need for additional research on farmers' utility functions, on
total economies and diseconomies of size , and on the process of the
generation of expectations. Hopefully, this study offers some encouraging
incentives for researchers in those areas. The issues of ownership and
control cannot be completely resolved until more accurate and con^jlete
specifications of the iii5)ortant parameters are made.
•«
t
i
i
n
H
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
.
C
H
A
R
A
C
T
E
R
IS
T
IC
S
O
F
IO
W
A
C
A
S
H
-G
R
A
IN
FA
R
M
S,
1
9
6
9
\
F
A
R
M
C
L
A
S
S
0
I
I
I
I
I
I
IV
(1
)
T
o
ta
l
A
c
re
s
1
8
2
,9
1
2
1
,5
4
4
,3
9
3
2
,9
5
3
,6
7
1
2
,4
4
7
,6
4
2
1
,3
5
1
,6
0
3
(2
)
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
F
a
rm
s
1
4
0
2
,4
5
2
7
,5
7
9
9
,6
3
0
7
,9
7
3
(3
)
A
v
e
.
A
c
re
s
P
e
r
F
a
rm
1
,3
0
7
6
3
0
3
9
0
2
5
4
1
7
0
(4
)
V
a
lu
e
o
f
P
r
o
d
u
c
ts
S
o
ld
$
1
9
,8
5
9
,6
2
9
$
1
3
4
,7
5
0
,7
7
9
$
2
0
9
,9
8
5
,5
1
2
$
1
3
8
,6
5
8
,9
0
1
$
5
8
,4
1
0
,8
0
1
(5
)
G
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t
P
a
y
m
e
n
ts
1
,1
8
5
,0
3
5
1
0
,0
7
6
,2
1
6
1
9
,0
7
3
,3
4
2
1
6
,4
9
4
,4
4
1
9
,0
9
3
,7
1
7
(6
)
T
o
ta
l
R
e
c
e
ip
ts
2
1
,0
4
4
,6
6
4
1
4
4
,8
2
6
,9
9
0
2
2
9
,0
5
8
,8
5
4
1
5
5
,1
5
3
,3
4
2
6
7
,5
0
4
,5
1
8
(7
)
F
ar
m
P
ro
d
u
c
ti
o
n
E
x
p
e
n
se
s
1
4
,4
2
6
,1
6
9
8
4
,3
5
2
,6
0
7
1
2
8
,7
7
2
,3
5
0
8
9
,8
8
1
,3
3
3
4
1
,7
6
5
,1
3
1
(8
)
N
e
t
In
c
o
m
e
F
ro
m
F
a
rm
in
g
6
,6
1
8
,4
9
5
6
0
,4
7
4
,3
8
3
1
0
0
,2
8
6
,5
0
4
6
5
,2
7
2
,0
0
9
2
5
,7
3
9
,3
8
7
(9
)
N
e
t
In
c
o
m
e
P
e
r
A
c
r
e
$
3
6
,1
8
$
3
9
.1
6
$
3
3
.9
5
$
2
6
.6
7
$
1
9
.0
4
(1
0
)
P
e
r
-
F
a
r
m
N
e
t
In
c
o
m
e
F
ro
m
F
a
rm
in
g
$
4
7
,2
7
5
$
2
4
,6
6
3
$
1
3
,2
3
2
.
$
6
,7
7
8
$
3
,2
2
8
(1
1
)
P
e
r
-
F
a
r
m
T
a
x
a
b
le
In
c
o
m
e
F
ro
m
F
a
rm
in
g
(4
6%
o
f
(1
0
))
2
1
,7
4
6
•
1
1
,3
4
5
6
,0
8
7
3
,1
1
8
1
,4
8
5
(1
2
)
P
e
r
-
F
a
r
m
O
f
f
-
F
a
r
m
In
c
o
m
e
2
,3
3
0
2
,8
0
7
2
,8
1
3
3
,8
3
3
4
,6
1
0
(1
3
)
P
e
r
-
F
a
r
m
T
o
ta
l
T
a
x
a
b
le
In
c
o
m
e
2
4
,0
7
6
1
4
,1
5
2
8
,9
0
0
6
,9
5
1
6
,0
9
5
(1
4
)
M
a
rg
in
a
l
In
c
o
m
e
T
a
x
R
a
te
4
3
%
3
2
%
2
8
%
2
5
%
2
4
%
N
5
4
>
-25-
FOOTNOTES
• -n I1. The variables B and z are equivalent to tt^ and z m Pratt s
notation.
2. See, for example, Van Home (pp. 21-22).
3. The sign of D is ambiguous without information about the size of
r(x). For the results to be consistent with risk averse behavior,
2however , dB/da^ should be negative. This requires that Dbe
positive. It was assumed that such is the case in further
development of the paper.
4. Cash-grain farms were used to avoid the complications of estimating
income from livestock facilities that would accompany land in
diversified farming areas-
5. This procedure is based on the assumption that the benefits of
deductions, exemptions, and tax management are exhausted in the
54 percent reduction of reported net income to taxable income from
farming. Thus, a dollar of off-farm income was treated as an
additional full dollar of taxable income,
6. For this analysis it was assumed that the simple perpetuity model
with constant growth was appropriate. It is possible, of course,
that the rates of growth in per-acre income and value, in the
short run, will not be equal. The model, however, is not restricted
to the use of the simple valuation model. If necessary, more
complicated valuation relationships could be incorporated.
I«
%
4-
♦
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7, The value of land and buildings owned by cash-grain farmers was
closest in value to those owned by Class II farmers in general,
8, The LEM utility function is defined over income rather than wealth.
If it can be assumed, however, that wealth is a discounted series
of future income streams, wealth is but a linear transformation
of income. Although the parameters of the utility function over
wealth will be different from those of the utility function over
income, the risk function r(x) will be invariant with respect
to income and wealth,
9, The linear cases of LDM were eliminated since they are but a special
case of equation (8), where r(x) = 0, Also, the cubic equation was
eliminated because its data points deviated so drastically from
those generated by the other risk functions. Finally, the range of
monetary values was terminated at $100,000 to avoid data points
that represented decreasing marginal utility of wealth.
10> The average value of cash-grain farmland reported in the 1969
Census was $434 per acre. In an auction system, the market price
will not be equal to the maximum bid price. Theoretically, it
should be one bid unit higher than the second highest maximum bid
price of the participants in the auction. The difference between
the maximum bid price of the purchaser and the actual purchase
price represents a form of consumer surplus that accrues to the
purchaser.
«-27-
11. The notable exception is Class III, where the risk premium declined,
Derivation of the risk premium gives tt = 1/2 r[x + ECz)]
z
(Pratt, p. 125) where tt is the size of the risk premium. Thus,
the risk premium is a function of initial net wealth, the expected
value of an acre of land and the variability of the value of an
acre of land. The risk premium also can be defined as
_ _ r[x 4- E(z)1d - t^^ 2
^ o cr • For Class III farms, the variance of
2(i-g)^ ^
2rncome was substantially smaller than for the other categories.
Hence, the smaller risk premium than for adjacent size classes.
I«
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